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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: AS LONG
AS THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE A TRAFFIC STOP,
PRETEXTUAL ARRESTS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL
Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
I. FACTS
On June 10, 1993, plainclothes police officers of the District of
Columbia Police Department were patrolling for drug activity in Wash-
ington, D.C., in an unmarked car. 1 The officers became suspicious upon
approaching a dark Nissan Pathfinder with temporary license plates
stopped at an intersection. 2 The officers noticed two youthful occupants
in the vehicle, with the driver looking into the lap of the passenger. 3 The
Pathfinder remained stopped at the intersection for at least 20 seconds. 4
The police car made a U-turn behind the Pathfinder,5 and as it did so, the
truck turned quickly, without signaling, and took off at an "unreason-
able speed." 6 The police followed the vehicle, and when the Pathfinder
stopped at an intersection, the officers approached the vehicle. 7 As one
of the officers drew near the driver side window, he observed two large
plastic bags of what looked like narcotics in passenger Michael Whren's
hands.8 Whren and James L. Brown, the driver of the Pathfinder9 , were
arrested and illegal narcotics were found in the truck. 10
Following the arrest, Whren and Brown were charged with violating
several federal drug laws.Il Whren and Brown moved to suppress the
narcotics found in the Pathfinder challenging the legality of the officers'
actions that lead to the stop and seizure. 12 The two men contended that
1. Respondent's Brief at 2, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841). The
Supreme Court called it a "high drug area." Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996).
2. Whren, 116S. Ct. at 1772.
3. Id.; see also Petitioner's Brief at 2-3, Whren (No. 95-5841) (claiming that the officers'
suspicions were aroused by the sight of "two young black men" in the Pathfinder).
4. Respondent's Brief at 2-3, Whren (No. 95-5841). The Court called this an "unusually long
time." Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
5. Respondent's Brief at 3, Whren (No. 95-5841).
6. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
7. Id.
8. Id. Whren and Brown, the other occupant of the vehicle, contended that, based on the
testimony of one of the arresting officers, there was only one bag in Whren's hands. Petitioner's Brief
at 8, Whren (No. 95-5841) (citing Tr. at 83, 92-94, 98-99, 102-03 (transcripts of the suppression
hearing)).
9. See Respondent's Brief at 3, Whren (No. 95-5841) (identifying Brown as the driver of the
vehicle).
10. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
11. Id. The charges against Whren and Brown included violations of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) and 21
U.S.C. § 860(a). Id.; see also infra note 16 (explaining the violations).
12. Respondent's Brief at 3, Whren (No. 95-5841). At the suppression hearing, Whren and
Brown sought to exclude the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop and arrest. Petitioner's
Brief at 3, Whren (No. 95-5841). In explaining the reasons for the stop, an officer testified at trial that
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the stop was illegal because there had been no probable cause or
reasonable suspicion to believe that they were engaged in illegal
narcotics activity. 13 Whren and Brown further argued that the officers'
alleged grounds for stopping and approaching the vehicle, to warn the
driver about traffic violations, was a pretext to search for drugs.1 4 The
motion to suppress was denied by the district court, which found nothing
to indicate that the officers acted contrary to normal traffic stop
procedures.IS Following a jury trial, Whren and Brown were convicted
of various federal drug violations in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia. 16 The convictions were affirmed by the court
of appeals.17
This comment will first focus on the two conflicting approaches that
the federal courts of appeals have taken regarding pretext issues.
Particular attention will be given to the United States Supreme Court's
prevailing approach. Second, this comment will utilize a case analysis to
focus on the approach the Court ultimately decided to utilize. Finally,
this comment will examine how the North Dakota Supreme Court has
dealt with pretext and the impact Whren may have in North Dakota.
II. LEGAL HISTORY
A. HISTORY OF THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE
In a pretextual arrest, 18 the justification offered by the government
the Pathfinder sped off quickly and did not signal. Id. at 5. The officer testified that he only pulled the
vehicle over to find out why the driver was stopped so long at the intersection. Id. He further testified
that "[tihe only circumstances that I would issue tickets-I'm a vice investigator; I'm not out there to
give tickets-is for just reckless... driving, something that in my personal view would somehow
endanger the safety of anybody who's walking around the street." Id at 7. The officer also testified
that "I wasn't going to issue a ticket to him at all[,] ... that was not my intention[,]... [m]y intention
was to pull him over and talk to him [about the full time and attention and speed violations]." Id. (last
alteration in original).
The Petitioners contended in their brief that it is against department policy to give oral warnings
and that the officer violated this provision. Id. at 6-7 n.8 (quoting D.C. Police Order 303(I)(A)(2)(b),
which provides that oral warnings should be given only under "extreme circumstances").
13. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772.
14. Id.; see also supra note 12 (discussing petitioners' arguments concerning the officer's
reasons for making the stop).
15. Whren, 116S. Ct. at 1772.
16. Respondent's Brief at 2, Whren (No. 95-5841). Whren and Brown were convicted of
possessing crack cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession of crack cocaine within
1,000 feet of a school with the intent to distribute, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 860(a); possession of
marijuana, a violation of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); and possession of phencyclidine (PCP), a violation of 21
U.S.C. § 844(a). Id.
17. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772. The court of appeals held, with respect to the suppression issue,
that "regardless of whether a police officer subjectively believes that the occupants of an automobile
may be engaging in some other illegal behavior, a traffic stop is permissible as long as a reasonable
officer in the same circumstance could have stopped the car for the suspected traffic violations."
United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 375 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
18. In this Comment, apretextual arrest refers to "an instance where a police officer makes an
arrest for an ostensibly proper reason 'but is in fact arresting in order to conduct a search incident to
arrest for which there is no independent probable cause."' Laurie A. Buckenberger, Comment,
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for the arrest is a sufficiently legal one, but in fact the arresting officer
made the traffic stop to search the person for another reason, one which
is legally insufficient to make the arrest in the first place. 19 The standard
to apply in determining the constitutionality of pretextual arrests has
divided the federal circuit courts of appeals. 20 Problems arise due to the
uncertain and inconsistent guidance the United States Supreme Court has
offered concerning pretextual arrests.21
Pretextual Arrests: In United States v. Scopo the Second Circuit Raises the Price of a Traffic Ticket
(Considerably), 61 BROoK. L. REV. 453, 453 n.2 (1995) (quoting John M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches,
57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 70, 78 n.36 (1982)). Also, as used in this Comment, "the term does not encompass
'fabricated pretexts.' which purportedly occur when 'the government offers a justification (for the
arrest) that is not the true reason for the police activity and, in fact, is legally insufficient because it is
not supported by the facts."' Id. (quoting Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solving the Pretext Puzzle: The
Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabrication in the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment Pretext
Doctrine, 79 Ky. L.J. 1, 6 (1991)). An example of a fabricated pretext would be the invention of a
traffic offense by a police officer after the arrest to justify the arrest and any search that followed.
Id. The pretext doctrine would not apply in such a case since the officer does not have the requisite
probable cause to arrest. Id. (citing United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1993) (en
banc) (Jones, J., dissenting)). Since there is no probable cause, the arrest is invalid and there is no
authority to conduct a search following such arrest. Id. (citing James B. Haddad, Pretextual Fourth
Amendment Activity: Another Viewpoint, 18 MICH. J. L. REF. 639, 643 (1985)).
19. See John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine: Now You See it, Now You Don't, 17 MicH.
J. L. REF. 523, 523 (1984) (discussing pretext arrests and searches). Another writer defines pretext
searches and seizures as "those undertaken by police officers at least in part for reasons other than
the justification later offered by the government." Butterfoss, supra note 18, at 1.
For example, a police officer may tail someone suspected of a crime, but lack the requisite
probable cause to effectuate a stop and arrest. Once, however, the officer "catches" the motorist in a
traffic violation, the officer then has probable cause to stop and arrest the person on charges unrelated
to the traffic stop if the officer discovers the illegal activity she expected in the first place. This is a
pretextual stop and arrest.
20. See infra part II.B (explaining the two standards).
21. Buckenberger, supra note 18, at 457. Buckenberger discusses three areas of Supreme Court
law. Id at 456-57. The first is the broad expansion by the Supreme Court of "the permissible scope of
warrantless searches incident to arrests." Id. The second area is the indication by the Court of a
concern with the expansion of this scope in providing police with "an incentive to arrest solely for the
purpose of conducting a search." Id. at 457. And the third area of concern is the wholly objective
analysis laid down by the Court "for determining whether [F]ourth [A]mendment activity is
reasonable." Id.
The Court has stated that searches conducted without a warrant are unreasonable. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (holding that searches without warrants are subject to a few,
special exceptions). A frequently used exception invoked by the Court is that police are allowed to
search a person they have arrested and certain limited areas within that person's control.
Buckenberger, supra note 18, at 457 (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)
(establishing the exception that allows police to search a person incident to a lawful arrest) and Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (recognizing for the first time that police have the authority
to search the place of a person arrested)). There are several other exceptions. See id. at 457 n.18
(describing the other "established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant requirement); see
also James R. Salisbury, Comment, Towards More Effective Law Enforcement-Utilization of Collective
Knowledge to Sustain a Reasonable Suspicion Inquiry: State v. Miller, 71 N.D. L. REV. 797, 800 n.21
(1995) (listing the exceptions as including: "investigatory detentions, warrantless arrests, searches
incident to a valid arrest, seizure of items in plain view, exigent circumstances, consent searches,
searches of containers, inventory searches, border searches, searches at sea, administrative searches,
and searches in which the special needs of law enforcement make the probable cause requirement
impracticable") (citing Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-1992. Part I of 4, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 877 (1993)). Buckenberger
points out that one commentator feels that the warrant requirement has been virtually removed by the
often invoked exceptions. Buckenberger, supra, (citing Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case
Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127,
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One of the earliest United States Supreme Court cases mentioning
pretext was United States v. Lefkowitz22 in which the Court stated that
"[a]n arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence." 23
Since some commentators disagree on whether Lefkowitz really stood for
the proposition that a pretextual arrest would be unconstitutional, 24 a
case that is more helpful in understanding the argument is United States
v. Abel.25 In Abel, Immigration and Naturalization Officers, acting on an
administrative warrant 26 for deportation, arrested Abel, and in a search
incident to the arrest uncovered evidence of espionage.27 Abel sought to
suppress the evidence by alleging that the government's arrest had been
pretextual. 28 The Supreme Court explained that if there had been a
pretext for the arrest, the result would have been a violation of Abel's
constitutional rights. 29 However, the Court found the arrest valid and
ruled out pretext because the arrest followed standard F.B.I.
procedures. 30
131 n. 19 ("noting that warrantless searches have become the rule rather than the exception and that in
1966, 171,288 arrests were made by New York city police with only 3,897 warrants obtained")).
22. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
23. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932). Lefkowitz dealt with the search of an
entire office incident to an arrest, which the Court found to be unreasonable. Id. at 463-467.
Le/kowitz is little help in understanding what a pretext arrest or search is because the warrantless
search of the office where defendant was arrested was for no other purpose than to search for
evidence of the crime for which he was arrested. I WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREArISE ON THE FoURTH AMENDMENT § 1.4(e), at 116 (3d ed. 1996); see also Haddad, supra note 18, at
654 (suggesting that the language in Lefkowitz is only dicta). Furthermore, Haddad points out that
Professor Burkoff is the only person who has suggested that the Court in Lefkowitz was condemning a
search that was otherwise legal. Id.
24. See Haddad, supra note 18, at 654 (discussing Professor Burkoffs suggestion that the Court
was condemning a pretextual arrest). As Haddad points out, Professor Burkoff's "suggestion stems
from a single sentence of dictum, at the end of the opinion, that declares that police officers should not
use arrests as pretexts for searches." Id. (citing Leftowitz, 285 U.S. at 467).
25. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
26. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 n.2 (1996) (explaining that an
administrative inspection is an inspection of a business by authorities responsible for enforcement of a
regulatory scheme, like an unannounced inspection of a business for compliance with safety and
health standards).
27. United States v. Abel, 362 U.S. 217, 218 (1960).
28. Id. at 225-26 (explaining that Abel sought to attack the admissibility of the evidence because
the INS warrant was a "pretense and sham" for the real reason, a search for espionage evidence).
29. Id. at 226. The Court observed that "[w]ere this claim justified by the record, it would indeed
reveal a serious misconduct by law-enforcing officers. The deliberate use by the Government of an
administrative warrant for the purpose of gathering evidence in a criminal case must meet stern
resistance by the courts." Id.
30. Id. at 232-33. An understanding of the important facts in Abel led one commentator to
conclude that there was considerable cooperation between the FBI and the INS. LAFAVE, supra note
23, at 116-17. From all the facts, LaFave concluded that the strongest interest of the government in
Abel involved his espionage activity. Id. at 117. Presumably, the reason the agents went to Abel's
motel room, to investigate pursuant to INS regulations, was a pretext for the FBI espionage
investigation. Thus, Abel presents another situation where the motives of officers do not require
suppression. Id. That situation is one "where, even assuming that intent or motivation was the
dominant one in the particular case, the Fourth Amendment activity undertaken is precisely the same
as would have occurred had that intent or motivation been entirely absent from the case." Id.
Professor Haddad agrees with this view and states that the language in Abel concerning
pretextual arrests has not carried much weight. Haddad, supra note 18, at 658. Haddad observes that
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In 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided Scott v. United
States, 31 and established that an objective, not subjective approach to
analyzing police activity should be employed. 32 Scott involved a wire-
tapping operation by government agents over a one month period. 33
The agents did not minimize, pursuant to a court order, the number of
conversations they intercepted. 34 The district court suppressed the inter-
cepted conversations, finding the agents' actions unreasonable since they
knew they were violating the minimization requirement. 35
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the constitutionality of
police activity rests on an objective assessment of an officer's actions.36
The failure of the agents to minimize did not diminish the legality of
their actions. 37 Furthermore, the Supreme Court agreed with the govern-
ment's contention that "[s]ubjective intent alone . ..does not make
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional." 38 An objective
standard is therefore utilized in analyzing police activity, but there has
been disagreement in approach. 39
this dictum in the majority opinion suggests that evidence might be excluded by the Court if the police
act properly within the Fourth Amendment, but do so for a purpose which is improper. Id. at 657-58.
However, "neither in Abel, where the claim of pretext was rather compelling, nor in any other case
has the Supreme Court acted in accordance with this suggestion." Id. at 658.
31. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
32. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135 (1978).
33. Id. at 130-32 (stating that the wire-tapping took place from January 24 until February 24 of
1970). Under a federal statute, government agents were required to conduct the wiretap so as to
minimize the interception of communications that were otherwise unrelated to the purpose of the
operation. Id. at 130 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976)). The agents, however, intercepted all the
phone conversations. Id. at 130-31. Many of the conversations intercepted were in no way related to
narcotics activity, in fact, only 40% were. Id. at 132. An agent testified that the only conversations
not intercepted were those that took place when the wire tap was not operating because the agents had
tapped into the wrong line. Id. at 133 n.7.
34. Id. at 132. Minimization was required under a court order authorizing the wire tap. Id. at
130-31.
35. Id. at 132-34. The district court looked at the number of conversations that were intercepted
in relation to the number that were actually drug related, and suppressed the intercepted conversations
along with all other evidence obtained as a result. Id. at 132.
36. Id. at 136.
37. Id. at 141 (agreeing with the court of appeals regarding the lack of minimization). The
appellate court held that the analysis should be based on the reasonableness of the agents in their
attempt to fulfill the purpose of the wiretap with the information that was available to them at the time.
United States v. Scott, 504 F.2d 194, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
38. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136. The Court stated that "almost without exception" an evaluation of the
legality of Fourth Amendment activities involves "an objective assessment of an officer's actions in
light of the facts and circumstances then known to him." Id. at 137. The Court further held that "the
fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which
provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action." Id. at 138.
39. Matthew S. Crider, Case Note, 36 S. TEx. L. REV. 629, 639 (1995). A subjective analysis has
been used in the past. Id. at 637 (citing United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Now, however, courts in the United States unequivocally reject analyzing pretext claims based on
subjective intent. See id. at 637 n.47 (noting all courts that utilize an objective analysis).
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B. Two APPROACHES TO PRETEXT ANALYSIs
In analyzing pretext claims objectively there have been two
approaches: the wholly objective approach and the modified objective
approach.40
1. The Wholly Objective Approach
This approach determines whether an officer was legally authorized
to perform the actions which lead to the arrest.41 The typical view is that
"so long as the police are doing no more than they are legally permitted
and objectively authorized to do, an arrest is constitutional." 42 Several
circuits have held that a traffic stop is justified, even where pretext is
alleged, if the arresting officer could have stopped the vehicle. 43 Nine
circuits, including the D.C. Circuit, employ the could have test.44
2. The Modified Objective or "Reasonable Officer"
Approach
In contrast, the modified objective approach 45 seeks to determine
whether a reasonable officer under similar circumstances would have
made the stop absent the invalid purpose. 46 This test has been applied
by the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. 47 These circuits have held that a
traffic stop is justified only if "under the same circumstances a reason-
able officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purp-
ose." 48 The Supreme Court had not yet dealt with the issue of a pretext
40. Id. at 639 n.50.
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th Cir. 1989)).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 782-84 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that "an
objective test should be applied to issues surrounding the constitutionality of searches and seizures
under the Fourth Amendment").
44. Petitioner's Brief at 11 n.13, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, (1996) (No. 95-5841).
The eight circuits who follow some form of the could have test are the second, third, fourth, fifth,
sixth, seventh, eighth, and tenth. See id. (citing United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 787 (10th
Cir. 1995) (en banc); United States v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 1995); Scopo, 19 F.3d at
782-84; United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 389-91 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc); United States v.
Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 729-30 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500-01 (8th
Cir. 1990); Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1039; United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
banc)).
45. Crider, supra note 39, at 641. This is also known as the would have or reasonable officer
approach.
46. Id. (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988)).
47. See United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that "courts should
inquire whether a reasonable officer 'would have' made the stop"); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d
704, 709 (1 th Cir. 1986) (stating that an objective analysis should be applied and the would have test
should be utilized).
48. Smith, 799 F.2d at 709.
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traffic arrest and search head on until Whren.49
III. CASE ANALYSIS
In Whren v. United States,50 the Supreme Court addressed the con-
stitutionality of a pretextual traffic stop and arrest.51 The Court empha-
sized that the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not
depend upon the actual motives of police officers involved in the stop.52
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court.53 He
began the Court's analysis by recognizing the limits placed on the
government by the Fourth Amendment. 54 The Court emphasized that
even the temporary detention of a person for purposes of a traffic stop
by police is a seizure of persons within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 55 Stopping an automobile is therefore subject to the con-
stitutional requirement that it be reasonable under the circumstances. 5
6
And, an officer's decision to stop an automobile will be reasonable only
if the officer has probable cause to believe the motorist has violated a
traffic law. 5
7
49. See Crider, supra note 39, at 636-37 n.44 (quoting Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1039 ("[The Court has
not defined the contours of a pretextual arrest and has never excluded evidence as the product of a
pretextual seizure") and Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 ("[T]he Court has never explicitly defined the
contours of the pretext doctrine")).
50. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
51. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1771-72 (1996). The Court stated that:
In this case we decide whether the temporary detention of a motorist who the police
have probable cause to believe has committed a civil traffic violation is inconsistent with
the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable seizures unless a reasonable
officer would have been motivated to stop the car by a desire to enforce the traffic laws.
Id.
52. Id. at 1774.
53. Id. at 1772.
54. See id.
55. Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). The
detention must be reasonable even if it is "for a brief period and for limited a limited purpose." Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659, and Pennsylvania v. Miroms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)
(per curiam)). Probable cause is necessary in order for police to effectuate an arrest. See 2 WAYNE
R. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FouRTH AMENDMENT § 3.1, at 5 (3d ed. 1996)
(explaining that a warrantless arrest is permissible upon "reasonable grounds to believe"). Under the
Fourth Amendment the police may not make an arrest or search unless they have probable cause to do
so. Id. LaFave further explains that the "reasonable grounds to believe" language states the
constitutional standard of probable cause. Id. (citation omitted). Probable cause, however, cannot be
established simply based on what an arresting officer believes. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97
(1964) (holding that a "good faith" belief on the behalf of officers is not enough for an arrest).
The protections of the Fourth Amendment would mean nothing if subjective intent alone were
enough, and citizens would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects," only at the
subjective discretion of police officers. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) (quoting Beck, 379 U.S.
at 97). Therefore, an objective standard is used to test for probable cause. See 2 LAFAvE, supra, §
3.2(b), at 33 (stating that the probable cause test is "an objective one").
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Petitioners agreed that the police had probable cause to stop their
vehicle for certain traffic violations. 58 The Petitioners argued, however,
that "in the unique context of civil traffic regulations" something more
than probable cause should be required. 59 Because of the pervasive
presence of automobiles in society, Petitioners felt it would be easy for
an officer to invariably find any given motorist in a minor violation of
the law. 60 To avoid this problem, the Petitioners contended that the
constitutional test for traffic stops should not be the one applied by the
court of appeals, 6 1 but rather, whether a reasonable officer would have
made the stop.62
The Petitioners argued that Court precedent supported the would
have standard. 63 To support this argument the Petitioner's contended
that case law has consistently spoken out against pretextual searches. 64
The Petitioners reminded the Court that an inventory search 65 by police
officers must not be a guise for looking for other incriminating
evidence, 66 that the Court had upheld an inventory search after finding
there had been no investigation pursuant to the inventory search, 67 and
that the Court upheld the constitutionality of a warrantless administrative
inspection on the grounds that there did not appear to be any ulterior
58. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772. The trial court found probable cause for the traffic stop "based on
three civil traffic infractions described in Officer Soto's testimony: Mr. Brown failed to give 'full time
and attention' to his driving[,] ... turned without signaling[,] ... and drove away at an 'unreasonable'
speed." Petitioner's Brief at 11-12, Whren (No. 95-5841) (citing Whren v. United States, 53 F.3d 371,
376 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
59. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773. Petitioners argued that the unlimited reasons for which an officer
can make a stop for technical traffic violations give police too much discretion and is really no limit at
all. Petitioner's Brief at 13, Whren (No. 95-5841). It was further argued that this discretion gives
police license to stop a vehicle for infractions like "[a] string hanging from the rearview mirror, a tire
touching the shoulder stripe, a lane change signal a moment too brief, or a pause at a stop sign to look
at a map." Id.
60. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773. The Petitioners felt the number of autos in society tempts police to
use traffic stops for purposes of investigation where "no probable cause or even articulable suspicion
exists." Id.
61. See Whren, 53 F.3d at 375-76 (holding that the intent of officers is not important as long as an
officer could have made the stop).
62. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773.
63. Petitioner's Brief at 30, Whren (No. 95-5841).
64. Id.
65. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 n.1 (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369
(1976)). An inventory search is a search of property that has been seized and detained lawfully, to
ensure that the property is not dangerous, to ensure that valuables are secured, and to protect against
false claims of damage or loss. Id.
66. Id. at 1773 (citing Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990)). The Petitioners relied on
arguments, concerning this and other cases, made by Professor Burkoff in several articles on the
subject of pretext. See Haddad, supra note 18, at 640 n.6 (listing several articles written by Professor
Burkoff).
67. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)). The Court
said that "in approving an inventory search, we apparently thought it significant that there had been
,no showing that the police, who were following standard procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation' Id. (quoting Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372).
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motives by officers in their search. 68 The Court in Whren found these
arguments to be of little weight 69 because the cases cited involved the
absence of probable cause. 70
The Petitioners also relied on statements in Colorado v. Bannister,71
which implied that the stop would be illegal if it were pretextual. 72 The
Court once again, however, dismissed this argument by finding that the
quotes from Bannister were taken out of context by the Petitioners. 73
The Court summed up this portion of the opinion by observing that
Petitioners could find no case law to support their position.74
After refusing to find any basis of support in the Petitioners'
analogies, the Court discussed precedent contrary to the Petitioners'
position. 75 The Court observed that the otherwise valid boarding of a
vessel by customs officials was not invalidated because the agents were
accompanied by a state trooper and were acting pursuant to a tip.76 The
Court flatly dismissed the notion that any ulterior motives by the
government agents would strip them of their legal justification. 77 The
68. Id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27 (1987)). The Court in Burger
found that the search was not, apparently, "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of... [a] violation of..
penal laws." Burger, 482 U.S. at 716-17 n.27.
69. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773. Justice Scalia summarily dismissed these cases by stating that
"only an undiscerning reader would regard these cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives
can invalidate police conduct that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation
of law has occurred." Id.
70. Id. The Court explained that the quoted statements in the case only explain that searches for
the purpose of administrative inspection and inventory do not require probable cause, whereas
probable cause is still required in searches that "are not made for those purposes." Id. (citing Burger,
482 U.S. at 702-03, and Bertine, 479 U.S. at 371-72). In Whren, there was probable cause to stop
based on the traffic violations committed by the Petitioners. See id. at 1772-73 (describing the
violations of traffic laws by petitioners). Thus, any arrest subsequent to the stop was valid.
71. 449 U.S. 1 (1980) (per curiam); see also Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 (observing that the two
cases, Whren and Bannister, are similar). In Bannister, the traffic stop was precursory to a plain-view
sighting and arrest on charges unrelated to the actual reason for the stop. Colorado v. Bannister, 449
U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (per curiam).
72. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773 (citing Bannister, 449 U.S. at 4 n.4).
73. Id. The Court stated that the language in Bannister relied on by Petitioner's was "dictum at
most." Id. And furthermore, the language
demonstrate[d] that the Court [in Bannister]... found no need to inquire into the question
now under discussion; not that it was certain of the answer. And it may demonstrate
even less than that: if by "pretext" the Court meant that the officer really had not seen
the car speeding, the statement would mean only that there was no reason to doubt
probable cause for the stop.
Id. Moreover, the Court stated that Petitioners' reliance on the per curiam Bannister opinion as an
indication of reversal of prior law was erroneous. Id. at 1774.
74. See id. (explaining that Petitioners' problem is not just a lack of support, but clearly contrary
case law).
75. Id. "Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative
inspection. ... that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary." Id.
76. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 584 n.3
(1983)).
77. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
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Court then pointed to United States v. Robinson,78 where it had held that
a traffic stop and arrest would not be invalid because it was pretextual.
79
Finally, the Court discussed Scott v. United States, and its subjective
intent language.80 The Court found that these cases foreclosed any
argument that the reasonableness of a traffic stop under the Constitution
depends upon the subjective intent of police officers.8 1
The Court then discussed the objective standard of reasonableness
that the Petitioners suggested,8 2 and determined that although the Peti-
tioners' standard is framed empirically, it is driven by subjective
considerations. 8 3  The whole purpose of the Petitioners' standard is the
prevention of arrests that utilize the traffic code for ulterior purposes.
84
Instead of a subjective standard, the Petitioners would have the Court ask
whether it is plausible to believe 'the officer had the proper state of mind
based on general police practices and guidelines.85 The Court reasoned
that it would be easier to figure out the subjective intent of an individual
officer than to examine the collective view of all law enforcement. 86
78. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
79. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221, n.1 (1973)).
In Robinson, the Court stated that a police officer had reason to believe that the driver of the vehicle
was operating it without a valid permit. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 220. The officer pulled the vehicle over
and "informed respondent that he was under arrest for 'operating after revocation and obtaining a
permit by misrepresentation."' Id. When searching the respondent, the officer found a crumpled up
cigarette pack that contained heroine. Id. at 223. Respondent urged that the officer "may have used
the subsequent traffic violation arrest as a mere pretext for a narcotics search which would not have
been allowed by a neutral magistrate had [the officer] sought a warrant." Id. at 221 n.l. The
Supreme Court held, however, that an arrest based upon probable cause is a reasonable intrusion
under the Fourth Amendment, and any search incident to such arrest requires no further justification.
Id. at 235.
80. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)); see also
supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text (discussing the Scott decision).
81. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774. The Court reinforced their position by explaining that subjective
intent does not have a part in "ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id.
82. Id. The Petitioner's proposed standard for determining reasonableness was "whether the
officer's conduct deviated materially from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the
same circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given." Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The Court pointed out that "Petitioners' proposed standard may not use the word
'pretext,' but it is designed to combat nothing other than the perceived 'danger' of the pretextual stop,
albeit only indirectly and over the run of cases." Id.
85. Id. The Petitioners based their claims on the premise that a reasonable officer would not
have stopped the Pathfinder because District of Columbia police regulations allow plainclothes
officers to enforce traffic laws only in limited situations. Id. at 1775. These police regulations permit
"plainclothes officers in unmarked vehicles to enforce traffic laws 'only in the case of a violation that
is so grave as to pose an immediate threat to the safety of others."' Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1775. The
Court asked "[w]hy one would frame a test designed to combat pretext in such a fashion that the court
cannot take into account actual and admitted pretext is a curiosity that can only be explained by the
fact that our cases have foreclosed the more sensible option." Id. at 1774-75.
86. Id. The Court explained that police practices vary too much from city to city to set any
reasonable standard by which an officer's actions could be judged. Id. The Court stated that police
manuals and standard procedure guidelines provide some assistance to an objective analysis,
"ordinarily one would be reduced to speculating about the hypothetical reaction of a hypothetical
constable-an exercise that might be called virtual subjectivity." Id. Furthermore, the Court stressed
that Petitioners' supposed basis for invalidating the stop may not be found in other jurisdictions that
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The Court also dismissed the Petitioners' argument that adherence
to these practices by police is an objective way of discovering pretext.
87
Petitioners relied on Abel v. United States,88 but the Court in Whren
pointed out that it did not hold in Abel that a pretext search and seizure
would invalidate an arrest in which probable cause is present. 89 Further,
the Court admonished, that Abel is directly inconsistent with views the
Court expressed in later cases.90
The Court next turned to the Petitioners' arguments concerning
balancing factors present in Fourth Amendment analysis. 91 The Court
saw the Petitioners' argument as a possible elaboration on the reasonable
officer test.92 The balancing that the Petitioners put forward would not
support a stop and investigation by plainclothes police officers in an
unmarked car.93 Petitioners contended that an investigation by plain-
clothes police is only a minimal advancement of the government's
interest concerning traffic safety and may infringe upon motorist's
rights by making them more confused and alarmed. 94 The Petitioners
relied upon Delaware v. Prouse,95 in which the Court found that discre-
tionary spot checks are not justified under the Fourth Amendment since
there are alternative ways to enforce highway safety. 96 The Court in
Whren distinguished Prouse pointing out that in Prouse there was an
absence of probable cause. 97 The Court concluded that where probable
cause to stop exists, it is only necessary to perform a "balancing"
have different policies than the D.C. Police. Id.
87. Id. The Court dismissed this argument because Petitioners cited no direct authority for their
position, but only dicta from two cases. Id.
88. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the Abel decision).
89. Whren, 116 U.S. at 1775. The Court felt that "it is a long leap from the proposition that
following regular procedures is some evidence of lack of pretext to the proposition that failure to
follow regular procedures proves (or is an operational substitute for) pretext." Id.
90. Id. (citations omitted).
91. Id. at 1776.
92. Id. The Petitioners would have the Court do a balancing test that they feel is inherent in the
Fourth Amendment. Id. Such a test would require the Court "to weigh the governmental and
individual interests implicated in a traffic stop such as [the one] here." Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. This view, Petitioners claim, is "supported by the Metropolitan Police Department's own
regulations generally prohibiting this practice." Id.
95. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). In Delaware v. Prouse, a police officer in a patrol car stopped an
automobile only to check the driver's license registration. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650
(1979). The officer smelled marijuana as he approached the stopped vehicle, and seized the
marijuana which was in plain view on the car floor. Id. At a hearing on the passenger's motion to
suppress the marijuana seized as a result of the stop, the patrolman testified that prior to stopping the
vehicle he had not observed any traffic or equipment violations, nor any suspicious activity. Id.
96. Id. at 659.
97. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776. The Court pointed out that the petitioners errantly relied on cases
like Prouse which "involve[d] police intrusion without the probable cause that is its traditional
justification." Id. Whereas there was probable cause for the stop in Whren.
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analysis in search and seizure cases when the actions of officers are out
of the ordinary and "unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or
even physical interests." 98
IV. IMPACT
A. PRETEXT IS IRRELEVANT IN TRAFFIC STOPS AND ARRESTS
In Whren v. United States the United States Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment reasonableness of a traffic stop depends upon
what an officer under the same or similar circumstances could have
done.99 The impact of Whren is that federal courts will have to apply a
could have standard in determining reasonableness of a traffic stop and
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, state courts may
have to re-evaluate their standards in pretextual stops following Whren.
If there is justifiable probable cause to effectuate a traffic stop, any
subsequent search and seizure is constitutional notwithstanding what a
similar officer would have done or what the arresting officer was
thinking.l00 This clarification stabilizes this area of law. This impact
creates broad police power to stop motorists and discover evidence not
related to the stop. Language concerning pretext and subjective intent
of police officers from early Court cases, such as Lefkowitz, no longer
means much in the context of ordinary probable cause stops and arrests.
B. THE IMPACT OF WHREN IN NORTH DAKOTA
Similar to the federal standard, searches and seizures must be
reasonable in North Dakota under Article I, Section 8 of the North
Dakota Constitution.101 Under Whren, a pretextual traffic stop is reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment so long as there is probable cause to
stop the motorist for a traffic violation. 102 A new question arises as to
98. Id. (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), which discussed seizure by means of
deadly force). In Garner, a Memphis, Tennessee police officer shot and killed a 15 year old boy after
reporting to the scene of a burglary and seeing the youth fleeing over a fence. Garner, 471 U.S. at
3-4. The police officer was acting according to police procedures and pursuant to statutory authority.
Id. at 4. The Court went on to say that in order "[t]o determine the constitutionality of a seizure '[w]e
must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests
against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion."' Id. at 8 (quoting
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)). For other examples see Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S.
Ct. 1914 (1995) (holding that an unannounced entry of a home is unreasonable), Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753 (1985) (holding that a physical penetration of the body is unreasonable), and Welsh v.
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984) (holding that a warrantless entry into a home is unreasonable).
99. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
100. Id.
101. N.D. CONST. art. I. § 8. The North Dakota Supreme Court has observed that "[t]he fourth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1. § 18(sic) of the North
Dakota Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures." State v. Phelps, 286 N.W.2d 472,
475 (N.D. 1979).
102. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1777.
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whether the North Dakota Constitution will provide more protection
against pretextual stops.
The first North Dakota case to deal with the issue of pretextual
arrests was State v. Riedinger.103 In Riedinger, the North Dakota Su-
preme Court followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Scott v. United States and held that the constitutionality of an arrest
under the Fourth Amendment should be resolved by objective
standards. 104 The North Dakota Supreme Court further stated that its
holding did not mean that motive or intent of police officers would
never be relevant in determining whether a search and seizure is legal. 105
Rather, the court felt that a case-by-case analysis would be necessary to
determine whether a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.106
Furthermore, the court in Riedinger opined that even though there
was not sufficient probable cause for the officers involved to search the
premises in question, there was reasonable suspicion. 107 While probable
cause and reasonable suspicion have similar definitions, 108 the North
Dakota Supreme Court indicated that probable cause is a higher
standard. 109
103. 374 N.W.2d 866 (1985). The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that while some courts
have "analyzed search and seizure issues in terms of the underlying motive or intent of the officers
involved, this Court has not directly dealt with the matter." State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 871
(1985). The main issue in Riedinger was whether a stolen microwave discovered during a valid
search for drugs and money should be suppressed as not within the "plain view" exception to the
constitution's warrant clause. Id. at 868.
104. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d at 871-72 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-38 (1978),
State v. Bruzzese, 463 A.2d 320 (N.J. 1983), and I LAFAvE, SFARcH AND SETZUR, § 1.2, at 47 (Supp.
1985)); see also State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86, 88 (N.D. 1990) (holding that the standard for North
Dakota is "an objective one"). The North Dakota Supreme Court has also stated that "[tihe trier of
fact must use an objective standard and determine whether or not a reasonable person in the officer's
position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about
to be, engaged in criminal activity." Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. Dir., 543 N.W.2d
479, 481 (N.D. 1996) (citing State v. Sarhegyi, 492 N.W.2d 284, 286 (N.D. 1992)).
105. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d at 872.
106. Id.
107. Id. (emphasis added). The court noted that "despite the fact that the officers' suspicions
had some real basis, a specific search for stolen goods was not authorized, perhaps because [the
officers] had not yet attained the necessary degree of certainty for probable cause, or because they
were unable to obtain complete information before seeking the initial warrant." Id.
108. In the context of searches and seizures,
Probable cause to arrest exists where facts and circumstances within officers'
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in
themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has
been or is being committed; it is not necessary that the officer possess knowledge of facts
sufficient to establish guilt, but more than mere suspicion is required.
B.ACK's LAW DIcrnONARY 1201 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Reasonable suspicion, on the other
hand, is "[s]uch suspicion which will justify [an] officer, for Fourth Amendment purposes, in stopping
[a] defendant in [a] public place is [the] quantum of knowledge sufficient to induce an ordinarily
prudent and cautious man under [the] circumstances to believe criminal activity is at hand." Id. at
1266.
109. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d at 872 (stating that even if there were no probable cause,
reasonable suspicion was sufficient in the circumstances before the court). The North Dakota
Supreme Court has other times distinguished between the reasonable suspicion standard and the
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Reasonable suspicion was again analyzed in Bismarck v. Uhden.11O
In Uhden, the North Dakota Supreme Court allowed non-probable cause
stops at a police checkpoint."'l The North Dakota court addressed the
issue of whether a North Dakota statute allowing police to stop and
question individuals with less than probable cause applied to motor
vehicle stops.ll 2 Even though the stop in question in Uhden was not one
listed in the statute, the North Dakota Supreme Court allowed the less
than probable cause stop and arrest.113
Recently, the pretext issue was revisited in Zimmerman v. North
Dakota Department of Transportation Director,114 where the North
Dakota Supreme Court held that to make a valid stop the officer must
have "a reasonable and articulable suspicion" that there has been a
violation by the motorist. 1 15 The court stated that for a valid investiga-
tive stop, a police officer must have "a reasonable and articulable
suspicion" that there has been a violation of the law. l 6 The court held
that the officer in Zimmerman did have reasonable suspicion to stop
probable cause standard when it stated that "the information used to support an investigative stop need
not support 'the more exacting standard of probable cause necessary to make an arrest."' Loralyn
Eckelberg Clark, Comment, Is "Reasonable Suspicion" Becoming "Probable Cause"?: State v.
Sarhegyi, 69 N.D. L. REv. 999, 1002 (1993) (quoting Wibben v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r,
413 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1987)).
It may be that the North Dakota Supreme Court established a standard lower than the one
applied in Whren. It appears that an officer in North Dakota may stop and arrest based only on
reasonable suspicion. This conflicts with the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Whren, which
requires at least probable cause. Interview with Thomas Lockney, Professor of Law, University of
North Dakota School of Law, in Grand Forks, N.D. (Oct. 8, 1996). This is a potential problem for
North Dakota. Id.
110. 513 N.W.2d 373 (N.D. 1994).
111. Bismarck v. Uhden, 513 N.W.2d 373, 376 (N.D. 1994). Uhden was riding a motorcycle and
was stopped at a sobriety checkpoint. Id. at 374. Uhden was not observed violating any traffic laws
and was not otherwise driving erratically. Id. The officers at the sobriety stop noticed that Uhden was
intoxicated and he was arrested for DUI. Id.
112. Id. at 375. Section 29-29-21 of the North Dakota Century Code allows stops in public places
if a peace officer reasonably suspects a person is "committing, has committed, or is about to commit..
. any felony[,] ... [a] misdemeanor relating to the possession of a concealed or dangerous weapon or
weapons[,] . . . [blurglary or unlawful entry[,] . . . [or a] violation of any provision relating to
possession of marijuana or of a narcotic, hallucinogenic, depressant, or stimulant drugs." Id.
Section 29-29-21 of the North Dakota Century Code was passed in response to a United States
Supreme Court decision. See Uhden, 513 N.W.2d at 376 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968)).
In Uhden, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated that the statute was passed "apparently in light of
Terry." Id. The court also reiterated the Terry standard: "It is reasonable in appropriate circum-
stances to investigate criminal activity without probable cause." Id. (citation omitted).
113. Id. Thus, a statute that was passed by the North Dakota Legislature in response to Terry,
and established guidelines for an officer to stop and arrest on less than probable cause, was ignored by
the North Dakota Supreme Court. See id.
114. 543 N.W.2d 479 (1996).
115. Zimmerman v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp. Dir., 543 N.W.2d 479, 481 (1996) (stating
the issue as whether the arresting officers' observations provided a valid basis for the stop); see also
Moran v. North Dakota Dep't of Transp., 543 N.W.2d 767, 769 (1996) (stating that the issue was
whether there was justification for the stop by police). The court stated that for a valid investigative
stop, a police officer must have "a reasonable and articulable suspicion" that there has been a




Zimmerman because he had crossed the center line.'17 The court further
stated that it is well settled that traffic violations, "even those considered
common or minor," are prohibited and give officers the requisite
amount of suspicion to effectuate a stop for purposes of investigation."18
Zimmerman contended that the traffic violation for crossing the line
cannot be used as the basis of an investigative stop because the officer
testified that she stopped the vehicle only because another officer told
her to, and not because of the traffic violation.11 9 The court stated that
they had resolved a similar issue in State v. Smith,120 which dealt with the
investigation of a possible open container violation. 121 The court found
the stop to be valid even though the officer's articulated reason was
insufficient, since the officer had observed other violations which provid-
ed him with "reasonable cause" to stop the vehicle to issue a citation. 122
It appears that North Dakota's standard in pretext cases of reason-
able suspicion as applied in Riedinger, or reasonable cause as applied in
Zimmerman, is inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's stan-
dard of probable cause as required by Whren. Today in North Dakota,
the standard applied in pretextual stop and arrest cases is too low. While
the North Dakota Supreme Court may disregard Whren, the court should




117. Id. at 482. The court found the stop to be reasonable even though Officer Sampers testified
that the road was compacted with snow and ice and she could only "tell approximately" where the
center line was. Id. at 481.
118. Id. at 482 (citations omitted).
119. Id. In Zimmerman, Jamestown Police Officer Jay Gruebele observed Zimmerman's car
parked in an alley in downtown Jamestown, North Dakota. Id. at 480. The vehicle remained parked
in the alley and officer Gruebele noticed someone get out of the vehicle and walk away. Id.
Gruebele approached the car on foot to give the driver a warning citation for illegal parking, and as
he approached, the vehicle drove away. Id. Officer Cindy Sampers was in the vicinity and began
following Zimmerman's vehicle. Id. Gruebele followed in his squad car and because he was
suspicious that there may have been illegal activity going on in the alley, he radioed Sampers to stop
Zimmerman's car. Id. Sampers followed Zimmerman and just before she executed the stop she
noticed Zimmerman "cross the center line once." Id. Sampers testified that although this crossing of
the center line constituted a traffic violation, "she stopped Zimmerman because Officer Gruebele had
directed her to do so, not for the violation." Id. Zimmerman was arrested for Driving Under the
Influence. Id.
120. 452 N.W.2d 86 (N.D. 1990).
121. Zimmerman, 543 N.W.2d at 482 (citing State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86, 89 (N.D. 1990)).
122. Id. (citing Smith, 452 N.W.2d at 89). In Smith, the court utilized the language "probable
cause" which adds more confusion to the issue. See Smith, 452 N.W.2d at 89. The court provides no
other more explicit language to indicate which standard a North Dakota police officer is judged by.
123. 1 would like to thank Professor Thomas Lockney for his assistance with this article. I would
also like to thank my wife, Kim, for her patience and understanding throughout law school and this
writing process.
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